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D ivision and Explanation in Aristotle’s Parts o f A nim als
L THE IMPORTANCE OF DIVISION IN ARISTOTLE
The nature and proper methods of logical division, διαίρεσις, are important concerns in at least four of 
Plato’s later dialogues, and reflections on the process may even have led Plato to a revised conception of the 
very nature of a Form. The place of division in Aristotle’s Topics - both in the organization of some of its 
materials and as the method for seeking definitions which many of the topoi are designed to regulate - suggests 
the importance διαίρεσις must have had in the Academy,1 as does the Epicrates fragment and Aristotle’s 
criticism of alternative views of the nature or purpose of division in Prior Analytics 1.31, Posterior Analytics II.5 
and 11.13, and Parts o f Animals 1.2-3.
But, as David Balme has argued,2 Aristotle criticizes these alternative views not in order to reject 
division but to reform  it. When he criticizes those who think the production of a definition by division 
constitutes a deduction, or even demonstration, of that definition, he reminds us that division is nonetheless 
useful, in the establishment of definitions, and appears to devote most of a long chapter (APo. 11.13) to the 
central role of division in "huntpng] out what is predicated in what a thing is"(96a22), which may be a reference 
to the definitions that feature as first principles in demonstrations.3 And when Aristotle rejects dichotomous 
division as a way of defining είδη in PA 1.2-3, he replaces it with division by multiple differentiae simultaneously, 
and argues that that procedure successfully avoids the criticisms dichotomous division falls prey to. Finally, in 
Metaphysics Z.12, he indicates how one of his reforms of division - the rule that one must divide "by the 
differentia of a differentia",4 e.g .footed by split footed5 and not by feathered - allows at least a partial resolution 
of the problem of the unity of definition.
Balme has even argued - controversially but not entirely implausibly - that definitions by division are 
involved in the solution to be found in Metaph. H.6 of the unity problem for the object of definition. And Pierre 
Fellegrin has insisted that the very concepts of γέι/ος, είδος and διαφορά which feature so centrally in the 
discussions of definitions and much else throughout the corpus, derive their precise logical relationships to each 
other from their place in the divisional process. These interpretative claims have been challenged, and 
alternative readings of some of the passages I’ve mentioned have been given, but these controversies, currently 
unresolved as they are, only underscore the fact that the topic of the place of division in Aristotle’s logic, 
metaphysics, and biology is an important one, and warrants more study.
The biological case is perhaps the most perplexing. For the critique of dichotomous division in PA 1.2-3 
ends, as I’ve said, with the firm endorsement of a method argued to work where dichotomous division does not. 
In seeking a definition of an ατομοι/ είδος (such as sparrow or crane), Aristotle instructs us to divide, not the 
γέι/ος Anim al by one differentia at a time, but a commonly recognized γέι/ος of animals (in this case Bird), 
marked out by multiple differentiae, by dividing these differentiae simultaneously, each as many times as 
necessary to reach the definition sought. In PA 1.4 he even goes on to explain how to select the γέι/η from 
which to start the process.
Thus the method, and now to work, one might think. But, as Balme put it in 1976: "The puzzle is, what 
happened to diaeresis after that? Aristotle makes no further use of it in biology; and no genos or eidos is
1Cf. Chemiss 1944 and Tarán 1981.
2Balme 1987; cf. Pellegrin 1988, ch. 1.
3Useful: APr. 1.31 46a31-29APo. 11.13 96b25-26 (cf. II.5 91b28-32). In fact, it is "only" (96b35) with division that 
one can ensure completeness. Alternatively, 11.13 may be concerned with pre-causal definitions (cf. Ross ad 
loc.).
41038a9-10; cf. PA 1.3 643bl7, and Balme 1972:102-103,117 and 1987: 69, 73.
actually defined." Or, to put the question more neutrally, does division have any role in the biology and, if so, is 
that role connected in any way with the reforms of division presented in PA 1.2-4, and more generally, with the 
discussions of division in the logical and metaphysical writings?
Now, I don’t pretend to have the answers to the larger of these questions. I don’t think anyone does, yet. 
But work done since 1976, especially by Bahne, Pellegrin, and James Lennox, has moved us closer to solving the 
puzzle, and I would like, in this small paper, to add one more piece to that eventual solution.
2. SOME RECENT WORK
In a recent essay on "The Reforms of Diaeresis",5 6 Bahne suggested that the reforms summarized in 1.2-4, with 
their focus on sameness, difference, and sub-division of differentiae, require a precise grasp of each of the 
differentiae that might appear in a divisional definition of animal είδη prior to the production of those 
definitions, and that the Historia Animalium  (chronologically the last of the biological treatises) was conceived 
as the vehicle for achieving that grasp. HA would thus not itself contain definitions by division, but would make 
such definitions possible. Aristotle never reached the stage of providing such definitions, Bahne suggests, and 
"we may indeed doubt whether [he] maintained this aim when his experience as a naturalist increased", since he 
would have realized that "there is no end to the recognition of fresh significant differentiae". But the 
"unfinishable" character of the collection and analysis of differentiae would not preclude the use of "the correct 
identification and grouping" of differentiae collected, which would "[lead] directly to the fundamental causes of 
animals’ attributes and differences. This might well have seemed the best way towards a methodical apodebds 
of living nature" (80).
But if Balme is right, it would seem that the reforms of division have now become useless - unless 
division so reformed plays a role in the search for and/or organization of scientific explanations. In two recent 
papers, James Lennox has argued that division indeed plays such a role, specifically in the pre-explanatory stage 
of Aristotelian science. In a paper significantly entitled "Divide and Explain" (1987), Lennox, as he summarized:
develops Balme’s suggestion that APo. 11.14 is a key text in solving the puzzle of the relationship between 
division and demonstration in Aristotle’s scientific method. Central to the theory of the APo. is the 
articulation of a distinction between incidental and unqualified understanding. Unqualified 
understanding requires locating the widest kinds to which differentiae belong universally: this allows 
explanations of why sub-kinds of these widest kinds have the differentiae in question, and identifies those 
features which are either essential to the kind, or explicable as consequences of its essence.7
To use an example from APo. 1.5, isosceles triangles have an angle sum equal to that of two right angles 
because they are triangles; we understand the former connection fully only when we understand why triangles as 
such have that attribute. From that we explain why, say, isosceles triangles do. Thus APo. 11.14 instructs us to 
seek, for any differentia to be explained, the widest class to which it belongs, and to do so by "selecting from ... 
the divisions" (98al-2). This procedure, as Lennox puts it, "assumes a set of divisions of a subject domain ready 
at hand, and as the examples suggest, organized along Aristotelian lines" (1987: 98). Those divisions will be the 
source both of the predicates of the propositions to be demonstrated and of their subjects, as we look up and 
down the relevant divisions for the widest class to which each predicate applies universally. Division thus helps 
"direct, or redirect, inquiry to the appropriate level for...explanations of...primitive predications" (99). Division 
as such neither supplies the true propositions nor identifies the actual causes - empirical inquiry of specific sorts 
is required for that - but it organizes the former and facilitates the latter. Research into HA which Lennox and 
I did in collaboration, he goes on to argue, shows that this "downward division/correlation methodology" is 
much "like what we find in" that treatise (99).8
5"For split-footedness is a certain sort (τις) of footedness" (1038al5).
6Part I of Balme 1987.
In a subsequent paper7 89 Lennox connects both the prescription of APo. 11.14 and the practice of HA with 
the account inAPr. 1.27-31 of, as Aristotle puts it, "how we may ourselves always be supplied with deductions 
about what is set up, and the route by which we may obtain the principles concerning any particular subject".10 
Although, as Aristotle says, "division by means of kinds is only a small part of the procedure that has been 
described" (45a31-32), Lennox is surely right that it is an indispensable part.
Division thus plays an important role in the pre-explanatory stage of science. But what about the 
explanatory stage itself? In his papers, as I noted, Lennox suggests that division is involved in explanation of 
why sub-kinds of a kind that possess a feature primitively also possess that feature, but as he notes this is at best 
"partial demonstration".11 What of unqualified demonstration, proper explanation? Is division involved there? 
That’s our question.
3. DIVIDING THE CAUSES
Once we have the connections to be explained at the proper level of generality, and are ready to search 
for the causes of these connections, is division of any help? There is at least one passage in PA I which suggests 
that it might be:
αναγκαίοι/ δε πρώτον τα συμβεβηκότα διελειν περί έκαστον γένος, οσα καθ’ αυτά πασιν ύπάρχει 
τοις ζωοις, μετά δε ταυτα τάς αίτιας αυτών πειρασθαι διελειν. (645bl-3)
It is necessary first to divide the attributes pertaining to each kind which are present in all the animals 
[of that kind] in virtue of themselves, and after that to try to divide their causes.
Now I have translated διελειν as "divide", but the word could also be translated "distinguish", in the sense of "set 
out separately". Peck has "describe", Louis has "analyser" and "discerner"; Bahne, on the other hand, has "divide 
off', and Pellegrin, in his discussion of this passage,1^  insists on "divide". If "divide" is not translated, this precept 
(as I’ll call it) would be pretty much equivalent in content to the following general methodological remark in at 
HA 1.6, with which it has some striking verbal similarities:
δι’ ακρίβειας δ’ ύστερον έρουμεν, *ίνα πρώτον τάς ύπαρχούσας διαφοράς καί τα συμβεβηκότα πασι 
λάβωμεν. μετά δε τούτο τάς αίτιας τούτων πειρατεον εύρειν. (491a9-ll)
We will speak in detail later, in order that we may first grasp the differences and attributes which are 
present in all. After that we must try to find their causes.
I think, however, that the stronger reading is the more likely one, for two reasons. First, the precept appears 
as part of a discussion of an issue that spans three passages, one each in chs. 1, 4 and 5 of PA I; these passages
7Gotthelf and Lennox 1987, Introduction to Part II: 66-67.




11Demonstration κατά μέρος. For references, and a discussion of my reservations about Lennox’s view of this, 
see Lennox 1991.
together make a case for beginning explanation at a generic level and moving downward; Aristotelian division of 
differentiae, as we’ll see, is the natural mechanism for that downward movement. Secondly, the organization of 
much of the explanation across PA II-IV is consistent with the precept, and illuminated by it> if bieXeiv is 
translated "divide". In what follows Pd like to develop these points, and make a case for the view that 
Aristotelian division does play a certain role in Aristotelian explanation.
(a) starting explanation at the generic level: PA I
The three PA I passages I have in mind are: ch. 1, 639al5-b5; ch. 4, 644al2-bl5 (most of the chapter); 
and ch. 5 645bl-14 (which begins with our precept). These three passages hang together. The 1.4 passage 
continues an aporia introduced in the 1.1 passage; the 1.5 passage resolves that aporia, referring in the process 
back to the two preceding passages. Let’s look at them in order.
PA 1.1 announces itself as concerned with the methodological principles (opoi, 639al3) that ought to be 
used in evaluating "the method of demonstration" in inquiries about nature.12 3 At first we don’t actually get 
principles, we get questions, the proper answers to which will be the principles. I reproduce Balme’s translation 
of the first question (with είδος however translated "form" rather than "species"):
Should one take each being singly and clarify its nature independently, making individual studies 
of, say, man or lion or ox and so on, or should one first posit the attributes common to all in respect of 
something common? For many of the same attributes belong to many different kinds of animal, for 
example sleep, breathing, growth, wasting, death, and any other affections and conditions of this sort (for 
at present we are not in a position to speak of them with clarity and precision). If we do speak of the 
animals severally, it is plain that we shall often be saying the same things about many of them. For each 
of the above attributes belongs to both horses and dogs and men, so that if one refers to each of their 
attributes one will have to speak repeatedly about the same ones - all that are the same in different forms 
of animal which having no differentia themselves. On the other hand there are no doubt others which, 
although they have the same designation, differ by the formal differentia. Animal locomotion, for 
example, is evidently not one in form, for there are differences between flying, swimming, walking, and 
creeping. Therefore [we have an aporia]. (639al5-b5)
It has often been pointed out that the first side of the aporia cannot merely be recommending brevity.14 
The kind of repetition Aristotle complains of is just the sort discussed in Posterior Analytics 1.5, as a case of 
failing to have grasped the actual cause, and to that extent failing to give proper demonstration: to give separate 
proofs, for instance, that isosceles, equilateral, and scalene triangles, respectively, have an angle sum equal to 
two right angles is not to see that it is in virtue of the feature that makes them triangles, and not of the equality 
or ηοη-equaUty of their sides, that they have that angle sum. But Aristotle does not make the connection with 
the APo. theory explicit, and the issue is simply presented as an aporia.
At 1.4 it is taken up again. Here the case for starting not with common attributes of the broad kinds 
(such as Bird), but straightaway with the attributes of the "indivisible forms" (such as sparrow and crane), is 
given a metaphysical twist: doing it that way, we get our subjects as close as scientifically possible to the actual 
ούσίαι - the metaphysically proper subjects (644a29-3315). Again, the counter-argument is repetition, now not
121986: 43,156.
13The verb δείκι/υμι is general enough to permit the list to include principles that pertain to the organization of 
information that occurs at the ότι stage of inquiry, as well as principles pertaining to the type of explanation, 
and the noun ίστορίο:, used as it is by Aristotle either for the ότι stage alone or for the entire scientific 
enterprise from start to finish, positively suggests it.
14E.g. Bahne 1972, Kullmann 1974, Lennox 1987. For an interesting discussion of the historical background to 
the question, see Kullmann 1974:12.
only its length but its "virtual absurdity" (which may be an allusion to explanatory inadequacy). Here he 
proposes a solution:
Perhaps then the right course is to speak of some affections in common by kinds (γέι/η), whenever the 
kinds have been satisfactorily marked off by popular usage and possess both a single nature in common 
and forms not far separated in them - bird and fish and any other that is unnamed but like the kind 
embraces the forms that are in it; but wherever [the affections] are not like this [i.e. common,] to speak 
of particulars, for example about man or any other such.15 6
The presentation of the aporia in 1.1 ended with a question. Here, the alternative of starting with 
attributes possessed in common across γέι/η is endorsed, although tentatively (ίσως, b l), and elsewhere in the 
chapter an apparatus for dealing with the LI objection to going this route is introduced. The 1.1 objection was 
that some attributes which are possessed in common exist in the animals in different forms. When Aristotle, at 
the opening of the chapter, explained the notion of common attributes that differ in the more and less, he 
introduced a way of dealing with at least a set of cases that meet that description without abandoning the virtues 
of starting at the generic level:
For all kinds that differ by degree and by the more and the less have been linked under one kind, while all 
that are analogous have been separated. I mean, for example, that bird differs from bird by the more or 
by degree (one is long-feathered, another is short-feathered) but fishes differ from bird by analogy (what 
is feather in one is scale in the other).17
But now let’s consider why starting at the generic level is a virtue in these cases: what, exactly, would be 
repeated if we only gave separate explanations for each variation of the common attribute? The only answer 
can be that the common aspect of the varying attributes is explained by the same thing in each case, a thing 
which would be said many times if it isn’t said all at once for the entire kind. We could, for instance, explain 
why long-feathered birds have long feathers, and short-feathered birds short feathers. In both cases what would 
be repeated must be the explanation of why they each have feathers. Feathers are something they have in virtue 
of being birds, not in virtue of being the sort of birds they are. To that extent, it’s the same argument as in the 
case of the angle sum of the three types of triangles. But the difference is also instructive, and spells out a 
pattern of explanation Aristotle must have had in mind. In the triangle case, the feature in question, having an 
angle sum of two right angles, is possessed identically by the three types of triangles, and nothing is learned by 
moving down to that level. But, in the case of birds, while we must start at the generic level, something further 
is learned when one moves from understanding why all birds have feathers (say because they’re needed to lift 
their weight in flying) to understanding why e.g. eagles have long feathers but sparrows have short ones 
(perhaps because of their particular weights and the type of flying their particular feeding needs require).
So, the pattern I am suggesting is as follows: Explain the differences in some generic attribute across 
sub-kinds of a large kind in some generic attribute by reference to the differences, across these sub-kinds, in the 
features which explain the presence of that generic attribute in the large kind. Now, this pattern is not actually 
spelled out here, since the focus of the chapter is not on explanation. And in principle nothing prevents there 
being cases where this isn’t so: certain variations in wings, for example, might just be used say for defense
15For Balme’s revision of his 1972 reading, translation and note for this passage, see Longrigg 1977.
16Readers of the Loeb PA should note that Peck rewrites the text of this passage. Bahne translates the MSS 
and I have followed him. I take δσα δέ μή τοιαυτα (b6) to modify the same subject the coordinate τα μέι/ κατά 
γέι/η κοιι/η (b2) modifies, namely the attributes, referred to as ύράρχοι/τα at a26 and as πάθη at a34, and so 
interpolate as I do; but it could be modifying γέι/η.
17644al6ff. Cf. HA  1.1 486al5-487al0 for a fuller discussion of the sorts of samenesses and differences in 
animal features, and the sorts of "more and less" relationships; the parallel examples for "same by analogy" at 
486bl9-21 and "differ by analogy" at 644a21-22 make clear that they are the same relationship (described from 
two different standpoints).
instead of for a distinct type of flying. But it would certainly be reasonable to expect our pattern to be the 
predominant one, and that, as we will see, is most often the case across PA II-IV.18
This discussion in PA 1.4 is followed by the famous exhortation to biological study which begins chapter 
5, evidently inserted by some editor (it has no connecting particle). Our precept comes next but the sequence is 
not a logical one and they cannot have been written one to follow the other. The lines immediately following 
the precept are connected with it, and tie it right back to the 1.4 passage, referring to it twice as it does. I quote:
It is necessary first to divide the attributes pertaining to each kind which are present in all the 
animals [of that kind] in virtue of themselves, and after that to try to divide their causes. Now we have 
said before that many belong in common to many animals, some simply (for example feet, feathers, 
scales, and affections too in the same way), but others analogously. (By ‘analogously51 mean that some 
have lungs while others have not lungs but something else instead which is to them what lungs are to the 
former; and some have blood while others have the analogous part that possesses the same capability 
(δύι/αμις) as blood does for the blooded.) To speak separately about each particular will, as we said 
before, often result in repetition when we speak of every attribute: the same ones belong to many. Let 
this then be determined so. (645a36-bl4; tr. Balme, with opening sentence modified and emphases 
added)
Here too we are instructed to start with common features and to move downward to more specific ones. There 
is one difference, which we will return to later, namely that analogy is now explicitly identified as a type of 
commonality - blood and its counterpart in the bloodless animals (or lungs and gills), although not common 
απλώς, are common by analogy, because they possess the same δύι/αμις (at least at some level of generality). 
This does not contradict the spirit of the early discussions, although they were restricted to the paradigm case of 
simply common attributes, those possessed uniquely across a single yéi/ος; for we can either divide the common 
function directly, or divide the analogous group of simply common features into the individual cases, and then 
divide each of the common feature down in the way required. But the addition of features common only by 
analogy will prove very important in understanding the discussions in PA II-IV, where sometimes different parts 
which perform the same function (e.g. eyelids, nictating membranes, and an unusually hard eye-material) will 
be grouped and explained under one common heading: eye-protection (657a26).
This passage in 1.5 may also remind one of the passage in APo. 11.14 where Aristotle explains that in 
looking for the proper subject of propositions to be explained - the widest class possessing a given feature - that 
subject will sometimes be a γέι/ος (e.g. bird), sometimes a group that is not a γέι/ος but nonetheless shares 
common features (e.g. the horned animals), and sometimes a group which shares only analogous features (such 
as pounce [a rigid structure in some cephalopods], fish-spine, and bone); they should be treated together 
because the common function they all perform will either explain, or be explained by other features they all 
possess in common.19
We began the survey of these three passages in the attempt to better understand the 1.5 precept to first 
διελεϊι/ the essential attributes then try to διελειι/ their causes. One the reading of it that arises from 
considering it in connection with the related passages in 1.1 and 1.4, it says, in effect: "One should start with 
larger divisible kinds and their common, divisible attributes. For each common attribute, state its (divisible)
18I referred in the previous sentence to the aims of this chapter. In fact, there seem to be two aims, and it 
would be useful to connect them, as I have not yet been able to do. One aim, which I noted in my introduction, 
is to explain how to select the kinds from which the reformed division described in the previous chapter should 
proceed; the second is to resolve the aporia developed in the first chapter. The two aims are obviously 
connected, and since one bears on division and the other, in the end, on explanation, understanding the 
connection should contribute importantly to the wider aims of this paper.
19Perhaps only analogously in common, 'ήAPo 11.17 99al5 applies: "And things which are the same by analogy 
will have their middle terms the same by analogy too".
cause. Then divide the common attribute, identifying for each of its sub-divisions the widest sub-class (of the 
large kind) that possesses it. Then, wherever possible, seek the causes of these more specific attributes by 
dividing the cause of the common attribute. Since many divisible attributes are possessed in common across 
large kinds (and sometimes even more widely), we mustn’t in those cases, on pain of repetition and explanatory 
inadequacy, start with the indivisible forms. Let this then be determined so."
If this reading is right, we now have a way in which division is used in explanation - not just at the pre- 
explanatory stage, but in the laying out, perhaps in some cases even in the very discovery, of the explanations 
themselves. There are various ways to test this reading. One way is to see if the pattern described can be found 
in the actual explanations offered in the biological corpus.
(b) The organization of explanations m PA  Π-FV
I think in fact that the pattern recommended by our 1.5 precept, so interpreted, pervades PA II-IV. I’ve 
suggested that the precept as worded focuses on a paradigm case but is meant to be taken more broadly. The 
paradigm case is one in which we have a proper kind, such as Bird, and a set of attributes possessed by animals 
of that kind in virtue of itself (feathers, beaks, inward-bending two-leggedness, etc.). Each such attribute is 
given a causal account (involving, typically, both final and material factors). Each of these attributes is divided 
into its various forms (typically according to more-and-less variations), and each distinct form of attribute is 
explained from a corresponding variation in the generic causal factors (i.e. from the particular nature and needs, 
and the particular materials available in the construction of, the sub-group of birds that possess it). But, as 
we’ve seen, the immediately following lines in 1.5 (as well as the related passage in 1.4, and the discussion in 
APo. 11.14) allow that the feature being explained may only be analogously common, and the subject class need 
not be a proper kind, but any grouping which correlates with a common attribute.
These extensions are important in understanding PA II-IV, because that treatise is organized not 
primarily by animals kinds but by animal parts. The subject class for each part tends simply to be the widest 
class of animals which possess that part, and that class may or may not form a kind. To illustrate my claim that 
the pattern is pervasive, I’ve chosen three chapters from different parts of the study, covering a variety of cases: 
the discussion of marrow, a uniform part, in Π.6, the discussion of eye-coverings, a non-uniform part (or set of 
analogous parts), in 11.13, and the discussion of external parts of birds, in IV.12.
The chapter on marrow is one of a series of discussions of uniform parts in II.2-9. By the time marrow is 
reached, there have already been discussions of blood, lard, and suet (two fatty materials, one earthier than the 
other). The chapter opens with an argument for the material nature (and cause) of marrow: it is concocted 
blood. Differences in the degree of fattiness of marrow across different animals are noted, and correlated with 
the presence of lard or suet in these animals. Then differences in quantity of marrow from one animal to the 
next are noted, and correlated with different strengths and densities of bone. Then we get causal explanation. 
The function of marrow (as evidenced by its source in blood and its location in bones) is established: it is the 
nourishing of bones. Since smallness of quantity of marrow correlates with strength and density of bone, the 
explanation is simple: a variation in function - "the nourishing of strong, dense bones" - explains the difference 
in quantity - "small amount of marrow". Similarly, the correlation of differences of fattiness of marrow with 
presence of lard or presence of suet points to the cause of those differences: since lard and suet are themselves 
concocted blood, and their relative presence has already been established to be a function of the density of the 
blood being concocted, differences in density of the blood explain the different degrees of fattiness of marrow.
The pattern? Identify the part, determine its general cause (involving both material and final factors), 
divide the part along the different more-and-less dimensions it is found to vary in. Correlate with those 
variations, variations in the causal factors, and establish that variation in the causal factors is in fact responsible, 
for variation in the part, thereby "dividing the causes".
And the eye-coverings in 11.13? The pattern is much the same. I quote the entire chapter in my own
translation to have it before us.
Humans and birds and fourfooted animals, both live-bearing and egg-bearing, have protection for 
their eyes. The live-bearing ones have two eyelids, with which they also blink. The heavy birds and some 
others, and the egg-bearing fourfooted animals, close their eyes with the lower eyelid, but birds blink 
with a membrane from the corner of the eye.
Now the cause of their having this protection is that eyes are moist in order that they may 
naturally see sharply. For, if they were hard-skinned, they would be less subject to damage by outside 
things striking them, but then they would not be sharpsighted. So, for the sake of this, the skin around 
the pupil is fine, and for safety there are eyelids. And because of this they all blink, and humans most of 
all. They all do so in order that the eyelids may prevent things from striking the eyes (and this is not due 
to choice but produced naturally); humans do so most often because they are the most fine-skinned.
The eyelid is enveloped with skin; that is why neither the eyelid nor the foreskin will grow back 
together - because the skins are lacking in flesh.
Birds which close their eyes with the lower eyelid, and the egg-bearing fourfooted animals, close 
them in this way because of the hardness of the skin around the head. For in the heavy, feathered 
animals, because they are not fliers, growth of wings has been turned into thickness of skin. That is ' why 
they too close their eyes with their lower eyelid, while pigeons and the like do so with both. The 
fourfooted egg-bearing animals, on the other hand, are horny-scaled, and these scales are all harder than 
hair; so their skins are also harder than ordinary skin. The skin around their heads, then, is hard, and 
that is why they do not have an eyelid there; but the skin lower down is fleshy, so that there they have an 
eyelid that is fine and extensible. The heavy birds, though, blink not with this eyelid but with their 
membrane, because the former’s movement is slow while quick is what’s needed and the membrane is 
that. And they blink from the comer of the eye alongside the nostrils because it is better for things of 
their nature to be from one source, and they have a source where they attach to the nostrils, and the 
front is more a source than the side.
The fourfooted egg-bearing animals do not blink in the same way because it is not necessary for 
them, being earthbound, to have their eyes moist and their sight accurate; but for birds it is necessary, for 
they use their sight for seeing at great distances. That is why the crooktaloned birds are also 
sharpsighted (for they sight their food from above, and that is why they, most of all birds, fly to great 
heights). Birds that are earthbound and not able to fly, such as domestic fowl and the like are not 
sharpsighted, for nothing in their mode of life demands it.
Fishes and insects and hardskinned animals have different sorts of eyes, but none of them has an 
eyelid. For the hardskinned animals can’t have it at all: the eyelid’s use requires action that’s quick and 
thus by skin. But instead of this sort of protection, they are all hard-eyed; it’s as if they were seeing 
through an eyelid that was directly attached. Since they must see less sharply because of the hardness, 
nature made the eyes for insects movable, and for hardskinned animals even more so (just as some of the 
fourfooted animals have movable ears), in order that they might see more sharply by turning toward the 
light and receiving its rays. Fishes, on the other hand, are moist-eyed, for, moving around as much as 
they do, they must use their sight from afar. Now, in the case of terrestrial animals, the air is easy to see 
through. But in the case of fishes, since water is a hindrance to seeing sharply and does not, as the air 
does, contain many things that can hit the eyes - because of this they do not have an eyelid (for nature 
makes nothing without a point); but for dealing with the water’s thickness they are moist-eyed.
The attribute being explained is "eye-covering”. Aristotle begins by identifying the widest class of animals which 
possess any sort of eye-covering. He then briefly divides the types of eye-coverings. In the second paragraph he 
gives the cause of the possession of eye-coverings as such, identifying both final and material factors. This cause 
explains blinking, and he immediately notes a difference in blinking between man and other animals and 
explains it by reference to a difference in the causal factors. He then returns to the differences in eye-covering 
and goes on to "divide the causes", explaining the differences in eye-coverings across groups of animals by 
reference to the differences, among these groups, in the general features which explain the presence of eye­
covering as such. "Divide the attribute ... then try to divide its cause."
- 9 -*
The external parts of birds are grouped and studied together in IV.12. Birds do, of course share certain 
generic external parts with other animals; some of these have already been mentioned in that connection, and 
others are noted in the course of this chapter, but birds do have a distinctive outer appearance and shape, which 
is the source of their initial grouping as a kind (644b7-15; cf. Bahne 1972 ad loc.), and a single common nature 
associated with aspects of that appearance which validates that initial grouping (644b3). In fact, Aristotle begins 
the chapter by making the case for studying the birds separately: "In the birds, the differentiation is in the 
excess and deficiency, and with respect to the more and less, of their parts; for some of them are long-legged, 
others short-legged, and some have a broad tongue, others a narrow one, and similarly for the other parts. And 
they have few parts among themselves which differ [significantly], but when compared with the other animals 
they do differ [significantly] in the form (μορφή) of their parts." Having said this, Aristotle lists a number of 
external parts distinctive (ίδια) to birds, including their feathers (and in general their characteristic wings), their 
beak, their inward-bending two-leggedness, and their distinctive breast, along with features they have in 
common with other animals, such as "a neck which sticks up" (692b20) and other generic features of their 
"trunk". Some of these distinctive parts are explained in terms of the basic nature of a bird ("the ούσία in the 
case of the bird includes being blooded...and being a flier is in the ούσία of a bird" (693b6,13; cf. Gotthelf 1985: 
43ff.) Differences among the different types of bird (grouped by correlated features, not by indivisible bird 
forms such as sparrow and crane) are then explained by reference to differences in e.g. mode of flight, type of 
food, mass of body, etc., that is, by differences in the broad general factors in the nature of a bird, both material 
and final, which explain the distinctive features of a bird. Here’s just one example. Earlier on, in the discussion 
of mouths of blooded animals, in III.1 Aristotle had identified the functions that the beak, which substitutes for 
both lips and teeth, perform: feeding and defense. Now, in IV.12, having explained how variations in neck size 
is explained by variations in the animal’s mode of life (βίος, roughly its habitat and corresponding type of food), 
he says:
Beaks also differ according to the mode of life. For some are straight, some curved; straight wherever it 
is simply for eating, curved wherever it’s a flesh-eater, for it is usefùl towards overpowering its prey, and 
it must get its food from animals, most often by force. Those whose mode of life is marsh-based and are 
herbivorous have broad beaks, for such a beak is useful for digging and pulling up their food and for 
cropping plants. Some of them, however, have a long beak, just as they have a long neck, because they 
get their food from some depth.... (693all-19, tr. mine with borrowings from Peck)
This chapter is not as simply organized as the others we’ve discussed, perhaps because of the complexity of the 
subject-matter, perhaps also because, as some peculiar features of IV.lO-end suggest, it may be very early; but 
the pattern is still prevalent. One can open PA II-IV more or less at random and light immediately upon such a 
pattern of argument.
Now, granted that differences in generic attributes are explained, for the most part, by differences in the 
causes of those attributes, why should we speak of these hierarchical relationships as divisions? For the 1.5 
precept to be recommending this pattern of explanation, as I have claimed it does, I will have to show that these 
sub-differentiations, both of the features that turn out to be explained, and of those that turn out to do the 
explaining, count as divisions. I think we have two criteria to go on. First, we must ensure that the sequence of 
attributes down which the explanatory progression proceeds fits the relevant Aristotelian reforms of Academic 
division, so that the process would count as a division for Aristotle. Secondly, we can see if any of the reasons 
Aristotle gives for the usefulness of division in other contexts. On the first criterion, I think we get a positive 
answer. Although the reforms of division are focused on definition, they apply more generally to the sorts of 
pre-definitional divisions we have evidence Aristotle himself had prepared^0. Bahne 1987 isolated three 
reforms: (i) distinguishing the categories of γένος, είδος, and διαφορά from each other, viewing a γένο ς  not as 
a separate entity but as a potentiality that exists only in its different είδη, an abstraction or determinable; 
(ii) insisting on successive differentiation - dividing only by "the differentia of a differentia"; and (iii) requiring 
that division be by multiple differentiae simultaneously. The first two reforms obviously apply to the cases of 
differentiation we have looked at. The subject of study is the immense diversity of animals in the natural world, 20
20cf. Barnes 1975: 240.
not some independent realm of kinds that are to be "interwoven" in some logical manner. The ontological 
distinction between generic potentialities or determinables and formal actualities or determinations is fully 
realized in the doctrine of the more-and-the-less which permeates the biology. And the explanatory pattern Fve 
described requires that the divisions be by differentia of a differentia, since there has to be entailment from the 
bottom up if the cause of the lower differentia is to be a form of the cause of the higher differentia. The 
multiple differentiae reform is meant to apply primarily to definitions of whole animals, but as Pellegrin has 
observed, it should apply as well to all those animal parts that require more than one line of division to 
characterize them. In fact, as Fve indicated, the "cause" which needs to be divided in biological cases is itself 
usually a combination of material and final factors, and the divisions of the materials and of the functions are of 
course distinct axes of division. So the sequences of attributes Aristotle uses in his explanatory progression fit 
the Aristotelian reforms of division.
But are they drawn from, or do they themselves represent, actual divisions? Are these lists actually 
organized according to these divisional rules and organized into groups of "divisions"?. Is there something PA 
II-IV is based on, or embodies, which could count as the "Divisions" (capital D) of which, say, APo. Π.14 
speaks? The answer here too seems to be yes, if we consider what the usefulness of these divisions is. We have 
already commented on the entailment relationship, from the bottom up, that is crucial to make the explanatory 
scheme work; the same relationship is commented on in Metaph. Z.12 in connection with definition, and said to 
be ensured by taking "the differentia of a differentia". One can do that without pre-existing division tables, but 
they facilitate the process. When APo. 11.13 speaks of usefulness of division it is in the role of ensuring (in fact it 
is the "only" thing which ensures) "completeness". That has a certain meaning in definition, but in explanation, I 
take it the value of a complete division, reflecting the whole of one’s survey of the attributes in one’s realm of 
study, is to give one an exhaustive supply of attributes to be explained and attributes that do the explaining. The 
all-and-only correlations Aristotle draws on in the course of producing his explanations depend on 
completeness of a certain sort, that the organization of attributes by division best ensures.
For all these reasons I am inclined to think that PA II-IV embodies a use of Aristotelian division at the 
explanatory level, not previously discussed by scholars, a use which is reasonably encapsulated in the 1.5 precept 
that "it is necessary first to divide the attributes pertaining to each kind which are present in all the animals [of 
that kind] in virtue of themselves, and after that to try to divide their causes."
My thesis, and the arguments I offer in its defense have various implications, and raise several interesting 
questions in my own mind, especially about the relationship of Aristotle’s thought to Plato’s, but I think it best 
to stop at this point, and save them, to be brought in during our discussion, in case they are relevant. At this 
point, I’d much rather have your comments than go on talking.21
Allan Gotthelf 
Department o f Philosophy 
Trenton State College 
Trenton, NJ 08650
21I am sorry that, due to some personal difficulties, I was unable to make this paper available in advance of the 
session. I would like to thank Robert Bolton, Catherine Culver, David Depew, and James Lennox for helpful 
discussion of some of these issues; none of them has seen the paper, however, and the responsibility for its 
shortcomings is entirely mine. [I would also like to thank those who participated in discussion at the San 
Francisco session, and Tony Preus for including the paper in the Fall mailing. I would be most interested to 
receive additional comments from Society members on this paper and its issues.]
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